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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is a Petition for Review of the Industrial Commission's 
August 21, 1992 Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Review 
alleging entitlement to workers' compensation benefits sustained as 
a result of an industrial accident. A Petition for Review of that 
Order was timely filed with this Court on September 11, 1992. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this Petition for Review 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2) (1988), 35-
1-86 (1988), 63-46b-16 (1988), and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988); and Rule 
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S)/STANDARD OF APPFT.T.ATE REVIEW 
There are two substantial issues presented for review: 
(1) whether the Industrial Commission committed error by 
applying the wrong standard of proof i.e., "substantial evidence" 
rather than upon a preponderance of the evidence as required by 
well established law; and, 
(2) whether the Industrial Commission abused its discretion 
by failing to convene a Medical Panel. 
The standard of appellate review which is to be applied to the 
resolution of the above issues is one involving "correction of 
error", since they involve questions of law, and no deference to 
the agency's view of the law is required. Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16(4) (d) 
(1988). Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah 
1991). Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah 
1 
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State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope 
of the Utah Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize 
that the Act is to be liberally construed and any doubt as to 
compensation is to be resolved in favor of the Petitioner. State 
Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 
1984). McPhie v. Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 
1977) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988) is the 
determinative statute in this case. Rule R568-1-9(A) of the 
Industrial Commissions administrative rules is also applicable. 
They are each set forth in full in the Addendum thereto as Exhibit 
A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Ashcroft seeks review of the Industrial Commission Order 
denying his Motion for Review wherein he alleged entitlement to 
workers' compensation occasioned by his industrial accident. 
Course of Proceedings 
As the result of an industrial injury which occurred on 
September 25, 1989, (R. at 1), the employer's compensation insurer 
paid temporary total disability benefits from September 26, 1989 
through June 5, 1990 as well as compensation for a 5% permanent 
2 
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partial impairment. (R. at 18). Petitioner claimed that despite 
attempts he was unable to return to work and that he needed 
additional medical care, a longer period of temporary total 
compensation and a higher permanent partial impairment rating. (R. 
at 1). Further benefits were denied, and Mr. Ashcroft filed an 
application for hearing. A Formal Hearing was held before an 
Administrative Law Judge on May 19, 1992. (R. at 22). 
Disposition Below 
On September 26, 1991 Petitioner filed for additional 
temporary disability compensation, increased permanent partial 
disability rating and medical expenses alleging that as the result 
of his September 25, 1989 industrial injury he was no longer able 
to work. (R. at 1). The Administrative Law Judge on June 29, 
1992, denied the claim for additional compensation, medical 
benefits and impairment benefits without referring the matter to a 
medical panel. (R. at 39-46, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit 
B). 
Mr. Ashcroft filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial 
Commission which was subsequently denied on August 21, 1992. (R. 
at 64-68, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit C). He challenges 
that final agency action in his Petition for Review. (R. at 69-80). 
Statement of the Facts 
There is no dispute as to the basic facts of Mr. Ashcroft's 
industrial injury. The initial period of compensation and medical 
treatment was paid. The dispute arises because the employer's 
insurance carrier discontinued all benefits before the petitioner 
3 
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and his doctors felt he had reached maximum medical improvement, 
and because his doctors felt he had a higher impairment than the 
supervising adjuster was willing to pay. 
Following the accident on September 25, 1989, and an initial 
evaluation in the emergency room, Mr. Ashcroft was seen and treated 
by his family doctor, Dr. M. K. McGregor, who continued to treat 
him during the following two months. (R. at 130-136). Dr. McGregor 
advised complete bed rest and diagnosed him as having a bulging 
disc/spinal stenosis. (R. at 133). After two months of 
unsuccessful treatment, Dr. McGregor referred the patient to Dr. 
Donald G. Bliss, a neurosurgeon. 
Dr. Bliss initially saw Mr. Ashcroft on October 20, 1989 and 
diagnosed, "Central disc herniation with minor spinal stenosis at 
this level." He recommended conservative treatment with physical 
therapy primarily for work hardening, but also had him under 
consideration for surgery. (R. at 146). In December, 1989 Dr. 
Bliss noted Mr. Ashcroft's continuing bilateral leg pain and after 
reviewing a myelogram and CT scan, his diagnoses was "Sciatica-like 
symptoms with central disc herniation and no definite evidence of 
neural impingement." (R. at 150). Dr. Bliss noted that Mr. 
Ashcroft7s multiple level disc disease indicated that he has had 
pre-existing problems. (R. at 151). On February 2, 1990, in 
response to an inquiry from State Vocational Rehabilitation, and to 
the dismay of the insurance adjuster, Dr. Bliss concluded that Mr. 
Ashcroft7s "... evaluation and treatment are incomplete. (R. at 
153). 
4 
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At the behest of the insurance carrier Mr. Ashcroft7s case was 
transferred to Dr. Neal Capel, an orthopedic physician. (R. at 157-
173). Dr. Capel's initial visit notes in reference to the 
insurance adjusters referral instructions state as follows: 
... Liberty Mutual account manager determined his 
permanent partial disability as 5%, March 26, 1990, is 
the cutoff of benefits... The patient will have his 
disability rating deferred until the conclusion of his 
work hardening and conditioning in 6 weeks. He will be 
revaluated on May 13 before he is released for unlimited 
activity. He seems to have had a strong improvement in 
his attitude and seems to be desirous of accepting and 
working with these provisions. (R. at 158). 
Dr. Capel placed him on a work hardening and conditioning program. 
(R. at 158). 
On May 10, 1990, Mr. Ashcroft experienced intrascapular pain, 
and was treated at an emergency room. Dr. Capel diagnosed this 
incident as "anxiety reaction with somatization." (R. at 159). 
Dr. Capel continued to recommend general conditioning. (R. at 
159) . 
On June 5, 1990, Dr. Capel's office notes state, "... The 
patient has no change in his status and was given a work release. 
(R. at 160). 
Although he had been released to work by Dr. Capel, the 
patient continued to complain of medical problems and Dr. Capel 
continued to give medical treatment, the last visit being March 15, 
1991. He complained that sitting made him uncomfortable and that 
he had aching muscles (R. at 161), and low back pain in November 
1990 after he lifted two or three pieces of firewood. In March 
1991, Mr. Ashcroft reported back pain after he had bent over to 
5 
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clean up after his dog, and that he had difficulty straightening 
up. (R. at 167). Dr. Capel concluded that he had a recurrence of 
iliolumbar strain spain and noted: 
I further advised him that as far as the Industrial 
Commission is concerned, he is an administrative catch 22 
situation where he cannot force them to assume care of 
his present complaint and while it is possibly associated 
in quality relation, it is a new episode. (R. at 167). 
After that Mr. Ashcroft concluded that he was not going to get 
satisfactory care from Dr. Capel and changed to Dr. D.R. McNaught 
on May 8, 1991. Dr. McNaught concluded that he had severe 
sciatica, due to the bulging of lumbar discs L4,5 and possibly LS. 
He recommended surgery, but surgery was never performed because it 
was discovered that the patient had AIDS which complicated the 
situation by rendering surgery a more difficult option. (R. at 174-
175) . 
During this period of evaluation , on August 19, 1991, Dr. 
McNaught stated that Mr. Ashcroft was unable to return to work (R. 
at 178). On September 5, 1991 Dr. McNaught reported "Apparently he 
was released from light work at sometime in the past, which I feel 
in retrospect was probable in error, as he does appear to require 
a more aggressive approach to his low back . . .". (R. at 179). 
Finally on April 23, 1992, after several other possible 
interventions including chymopapain treatment had been considered 
and ruled out, Dr. McNaught concluded that Mr. Ashcroft had a 10% 
disability rating. (R. at 177). Dr. John Sanders, a consulting 
surgeon for Dr. McNaught, independently rated the permanent 
impairment at 15%. (R. at 191). 
6 
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During this period, Mr. Ashcroft also received at his own 
expense chiropractic care from Dr. Randall N. Wageman from 
September 27, 1991, through December, 1991 when he was forced to 
terminate treatment for financial reasons. Dr. Wageman concluded 
that Mr. Ashcroft suffered, "Chronic moderate to severe post-
traumatic lumbar intervertebral disc syndrome with radiculopathy 
resulting from over-exertion or strenuous movements." He further 
found "an exacerbation of his post-traumatic injuries sustained in 
the original accident" of 1989. (R. at 122). 
Respondents did not have Mr. Ashcroft personally examined by 
a physician of their own choosing, but did have Dr. Boyd Holbrook 
perform a "file review". On April 10, 1992, Dr. Holbrook concluded 
on the basis of his examination of the medical records, which did 
not include the reports of Dr. Wageman, that the majority of Mr. 
Ashcroft's problems were not industrial in nature and that no 
further medical treatment was needed in connection with his 1989 
industrial injury. (R. at 23-31). 
The Administrative Law Judge found that there was not a 
well-supported rating in the record, and the 
Administrative Law Judge can only note that a 5% 
impairment is reasonable for an unoperated disc problem 
according to the AMA Guides To The Evaluation of 
Permanent Impairment, Table 53." (R. at 45). 
Despite request by Mr. Ashcroft's attorney the Administrative Law 
Judge refused to refer Mr. Ashcroft to a Medical Panel. (R. at 47). 
This refusal was subsequently sustained by the Industrial 
Commission. (R. at 67). 
Petitioner's claim for additional disability benefits was 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
denied by the Administrative Law Judge on June 29th, 1992. (R. at 
45). He filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission 
on July 15, 1992 (R. at 47-54), but it was denied on August 21, 
1992. (R. at 64-68) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S) 
The Industrial Commission's findings were based on the wrong 
standard of evidence. The Commission refused to disturb the 
Administrative Law Judge's Findings because they "... were based 
upon substantial evidence." The Commission applied the higher 
appellate court review standard rather than the lower level 
appropriateD at the Industrial Commission level. The appropriate 
standard of review at the agency level is a "preponderance of the 
evidence." Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 592 P. 616 (Utah 
1979). 
The medical evidence in this case demonstrated conflicting 
disability ratings which ranged from zero % to 15%. Utah 
Administrative Code R568-1-9 makes the referral to a Medical Panel 
mandatory when there are conflicting impairment ratings with more 
than a 5% difference. Despite the fact that the Administrative Law 
Judge found that the disability ratings were not "well-supported" 
she failed and refused to submit this matter to a Medical Panel. 
Referral to a Medical panel was also called for under the Rule when 
there is a dispute about the cutoff date of temporary total 
disability and/or more than $2,000.00 in medical bills in 
controversy. The refusal to convene a Medical Panel is in direct 
8 
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conflict and violates the Industrial Commission's own rules and 
regulations. 
This Court should summarily reverse the Industrial 
Commission's determination that Mr. Ashcroft did not establish 
medical causation and remand with instructions to enter an award 
establishing that fact. In the alternative, this matter should be 
remanded with instructions to the Industrial Commission to convene 
a Medical Panel to examine the medical causation issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLTFD T.TKEKAT.T.Y 
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO 
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED 
WORKER, 
Few principles of workers7 compensation law are as well 
established in this State as that workers7 compensation disability 
claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits, 
and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor 
of the claim. Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this 
principle from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fundf 
796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); State Tax Commission v. Industrial 
Commission, supra.,; J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v. Industrial Commission. 610 P.2d 
1362 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. Industrial Commission, supra.; Baker v. 
Industrial Commission, 405 P.2d 613 (Utah 1965); Askrew v. 
Industrial Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M & K Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission, 189 P. 2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v. 
9 
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Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra, at 1021-1022, 
discussed the proper construction of the Workers7 Compensation Act 
and the underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows: 
We are also reminded that our statute requires that 
the statues of this state are to be 'liberally construed 
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to 
promote justice.' 
* * * * * * 
In this connection it must be remembered that the 
compensation provided for in the act is in no sense to be 
considered as damages for the injured employee or to his 
dependents in case death supervenes. The right to 
compensation arises out of the relation existing between 
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of 
[or] in the course of the employment. Under such an act 
the costs and expenses of conducting the business or 
enterprise, including compensation for injuries to 
*employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the 
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the 
whole cost and expense of conducting the business as 
aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are 
produced and sold, and hence, in the long run, such costs 
and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the 
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such 
an act, therefore, is to protect the employee and those 
dependent upon him, and in case of his serious injury or 
death to provide adequate means for the support of those 
dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in case of 
total disability or death of the employee his dependents 
might become the objects of public charity, such a 
calamity is avoided by requiring the business or 
enterprise to provide for such dependents, with the right 
of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the 
cost of producing and selling the product of such 
business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such 
acts are therefore apparent to all, and for that reason, 
if for no other, should receive a very liberal 
construction in favor of the injured employee. We are 
all united upon the proposition that in view of the 
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt 
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should 
be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as 
the case may be. (Emphasis added). 
The Administrative Law Judge in rendering her Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law failed to apply this vital rule of 
10 
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construction. Nowhere in her Findings or Conclusions is there any 
evidence of a "liberal construction" or the "resolution of doubt in 
favor of the claim". Whenever any doubt or uncertainty appears in 
the record, the Administrative Law Judge construed it against the 
injured worker. 
The refusal to refer this matter to a Medical Panel is in 
clear violation of the Industrial Commission's own rules and 
regulations. The "findings" and "conclusions" do not evidence 
"humane and beneficent purposes" as required by law. The entire 
underlying basis of the Order is thus flawed and the entire Order 
should be disregarded due to this conceptual flaw. 
II 
THE CONTINUING MEDICAL PROBLEMS CLEARLY AROSE OUT OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT AND NOT OUT OF SUBSEQUENT "EPISODES," 
The Administrative Law Judge based her denial on the 
following: 
... according to medical specialists, the true cause of 
the applicants continuing problems stem from pre-
existing degenerative problems, intervening non-
industrial events, and unrelated health conditions. 
Therefore, his claim fails for lack of medical and legal 
causation. (R. at 42). 
A balanced review of the record demonstrates that Mr. Ashcroft 
met his burden to demonstrate legal and medical causation by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
The alleged "intervening non-industrial events" have been 
blown entirely out of proportion by deeming them as causes of 
ongoing injury when the evidence shows no subsequent events that 
11 
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would constitute an industrial accident and no medical evidence of 
anything other than an episode of pain triggered by ordinary and 
nonstrenuous activities which were painful only because of the 
ongoing back injury that was caused by the original industrial 
accident. These supposed "intervening nonindustrial events" were 
picking up three pieces of firewood in November, 1990 (R. at 165) 
and bending over with a short-handled shovel to clean up after his 
dog, in March 1991. (R. at 167). It would be difficult to classify 
those incidents as legally or medically significant events. 
Although each event resulted in an office visit to Dr. Capel, no 
new treatment was undertaken and Mr. Ashcroft's condition did not 
change. No continuing significance for those events can be found 
in the medical records. The fact that the Administrative Law Judge 
and the Industrial Commission seized upon them shows that they were 
engaged in improper fact finding. 
If there was any failure to find a medical cause of the 
injuries Petitioner demonstrates, such failure resulted from the 
Administrative Law Judge's failure to convene a Medical Panel, as 
argued below. 
The existing record however is replete with evidence of 
medical causation. In reaching the conclusion that there was not 
a medical/industrial cause to Mr. Ashcroft's present condition the 
Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission selectively 
read the medical reports and ignored large portions of the 
evidence. Dr. McGregor found a medical/industrial link (R. at 130-
136), as did Dr. Bliss (R. at 146-153), Dr. Capel (R. at 158), Dr. 
12 
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McNaught (R. at 177) and Dr. Wageman (R. at 122). In fact, the 
only real evidence supporting the lack of medical causation is Dr. 
Holbrook's "record review" (R. at 23-31) which was done without 
actually examining Mr. Ashcroft, or having the complete medical 
record. 
There is a uncertainty as to the extent of Petitioner's pre-
existing back problems. However, just because a person suffers a 
pre-existing condition, he or she is not disqualified from 
obtaining compensation. "Compensation is not dependant on the 
state of an employee's health or his freedom from constitutional 
weakness or latent tendency." Denver v. Hansen, 650 P.2d 1319, 
1321 (Colo. App., 1982). The clear law of this state is that "the 
aggravation or lighting up of a preexisting disease by an 
industrial accident is compensable...." Powers v. Industrial 
Commission, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967) (quoted with approval in 
Allen, id.). 
There was no medical evidence offered at the hearing which 
would suggest that Petitioner's injuries were not at least 
partially the result of the industrial accident. The 
Administrative Law Judge expressly found that at least 5% of Mr. 
Ashcroft's permanent impairment was due to the industrial accident. 
In its review, the Industrial Commission states that "We have 
concluded that the specialists who determined that the applicant's 
problems were not industrial in nature outweigh the opinion of Dr. 
Wageman." (R. at 67). The Commission does not detail however how 
they reached that conclusion or what balancing process they went 
13 
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through. In fact, the Industrial Commission did not review the 
record impartially or as a whole. The Industrial Commission only 
cites those portions of the record which support the findings of 
the Administrative Law Judge and ignores any conflicting evidence. 
The Industrial Commission simply cannot arbitrarily discount 
competent, uncontradicted evidence indicating that the industrial 
injury was the cause of Petitioner's present permanent, disability. 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission., 709 P.2d 1168 (Utah 
1985). Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs, 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984). 
In addition, The Industrial Commission displayed confusion and 
committed error when it sustained the Findings, Conclusions and 
Order of the Administrative Law Judge as being based upon 
"substantial evidence". (R. at 65). The applicable standard is 
that of "preponderance of the evidence" and not "substantial 
evidence". In the case of Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 592 P.2d 
616 (Utah 1979) the Utah Supreme Court reversed a similar effort of 
the Industrial Commission to apply another standard than 
preponderance of evidence. The Court stated as follows: 
This Court has consistently held that the burden of proof 
in Workmen's Compensation cases is proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 618. 
Counsel for the Industrial Commission has admitted that he 
uses the appellate standard of "substantial evidence" in passing on 
Motions for Review. Virgin v. Industrial Commission, 803 P.2d 1284, 
1290 (Utah App. 1990). There is no evidence of balancing of the 
conflicting evidence by the Industrial Commission and certainly no 
resolution of doubt in favor of the Petitioner. The Industrial 
14 
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Commission Order Denying Motion For Review rather is a marshalling 
of the evidence in support of the Administrative Law Judge's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, to the total 
exclusion of any contrary evidence. 
The application of the "substantial evidence" standard is 
contrary to law and prejudices the injured worker by making him 
respond to a higher standard of proof than required by law and 
statute. 
The actual Findings of Fact portion of the Order in this 
matter are grossly inadequate and do not meet recent legal 
requirements. Such summary conclusions do not constitute proper 
fact-finding. 
In the recent case of Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), the Court stated as follows: 
While the purported "Findings of Fact written by the 
A.L.J, contain an informative summary of the evidence 
presented, such a rehearsal of contradictory evidence 
does not constitute findings of fact. In order for a 
finding to truly constitute a "finding of fact," it must 
indicate what the A.L.J, determines in fact occurred.... 
The evidence did not merely indicate two possible 
versions of a fact whereby we could conclude that the 
denial of benefits necessarily indicates that the 
Commission accepted one version over another. The 
evidence shows several possible configurations and 
degrees of injury and/or disease, if any, and the causes, 
if any, thereby creating a matrix of possible factual 
findings. A mere summary of the conflicting evidence in 
this case therefore does not give a clear indication of 
the A.L.J.'s or the Commission's view as to what in fact 
occurred. Since we cannot even determine why the 
Commission found there was no causation shown, we clearly 
cannot assume that the Commission actually made any of 
the possible subsidiary findings. The findings are 
therefore inadequate. Id. at 20. 
The Findings made by the Administrative Law Judge and the 
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Industrial Commission are deficient in that they fail to properly 
address, in detail, the issue of medical causation. The absence of 
a Medical Panel report makes this failure even more glaring. 
Although none of the parties, including the Administrative Law 
Judge, dispute that Petitioner is permanently impaired, the 
Administrative Law Judge did not specify the degree to which that 
disability was caused by the 1989 industrial injury. The 
Administrative Law Judge selectively reads the medical reports, 
giving undue weight to a file review by Dr. Holbrook while 
virtually ignoring the preponderance of the medical evidence. She 
does not make concise findings as to Petitionees current medical 
condition and the causes for it. This failure was undoubtedly 
compounded by the Administrative Law Judge,s unwarranted refusal to 
submit the matter to a Medical Panel as complained below, and that 
failure manifests itself here in inadequate findings. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently informed this 
Commission that: 
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of 
the Commission, the findings must be 'sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached.' Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 
996 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P. 2d 
1336 (Utah 1979))...[T]he failure of an agency to make 
adequate findings of fact on material issues renders its 
findings 'arbitrary and capricious' unless the evidence 
is 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one 
conclusion.' Id. (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 
233, 236 (Utah 1983)). 
Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 
1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
The Administrative Law Judge's purported Findings of Fact, 
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Conclusions of Law and Order should at a minimum be vacated and a 
new Order entered with detailed and subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion was reached. Failure to 
do so, denies Petitioner the ability to marshal the evidence in 
support of the findings and show that it is not substantial. Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P. 2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
Ill 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN NOT 
REFERRING THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL, 
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-77(1)(a) (1988) reads as 
follows: 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by 
accident, or for death, arising out of or in the course 
of employment, and if the employer or its insurance 
carrier denies liability, the commission may refer the 
medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed 
by the commission. 
In response to Petitioner's claim that despite requests by 
counsel, the Administrative Law Judge failed and/or refused to 
refer this matter to a Medical Panel, Respondent Utah Industrial 
Commission in its Order Denying Motion for Review states as 
follows: 
the Applicant has failed to show medical and legal 
causation. Under these circumstances, no medical panel 
is necessary. (R. at 45). 
That rational finds no basis in law, statute or rule. Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988) expressly contemplates that 
referrals to Medical Panels will result "... if the employer or its 
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insurance carrier denies liability..." It is expressly to 
determine medical causation and degrees of disability that 
referrals to Medical Panels are made. 
Utah Industrial Commission Rule R568-1-9 governing the 
"necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel" provided in 
relevant part as follows: 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission 
adopts the following guidelines in determining the 
necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be 
shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent 
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole 
person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days, 
and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to 
more than $2,000.... (emphasis added). See Addendum, 
Exhibit A. 
The Rule requires that a panel "will" be used when "one or 
more significant medical issues may be involved". The rule does 
not, as Respondents seem to suggest, state that a Medical Panel 
will only be convened when the injured worker has proved both 
medical and legal causation. Rather the Rule states that a Panel 
will be used when there are conflicting medical reports of 
permanent physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole 
person, a disparity of more than 90 days on the temporary total 
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cutoff date or more than $2,000 in medical expenses in controversy. 
It can not be disputed that this case clearly contains 
conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which 
vary by more than 5% of the whole person. Dr. Holbrook gave Mr. 
Ashcroft a zero % physical impairment. (R. at 23-31), Dr. McNaught 
rated the Petitioner at 10% impairment of the whole person (R. at 
177), and Dr. Sanders indicated that he had a 15% whole person 
rating (R. at 191), a difference of 15%. 
It little matters that Respondents do not believe that the 
doctor's ratings are "not well supported" (R. at 37). It appears 
that at least Dr. McNaught did not extensively document his 10% 
rating because the insurance carrier told him that they agreed with 
it. In such a case, Dr. McNaught reasonably concluded that he 
would not have to give all of his subsidiary findings which led him 
to conclude that the Petitioner had a 10% impairment. Respondents 
should be estopped from attacking the lack of detailed support for 
the disability ratings when they were responsible for the omission 
of that support. (R. at 177). 
The Rule does not say that referral will occur only when the 
Administrative Law Judge or the Industrial Commission finds that 
there are "well supported conflicting medical reports;" rather it 
states that referral will occur when there are "conflicting medical 
reports", (emphasis added). It is, in fact, to determine the 
credibility of the initial medical reports that referrals to 
Medical Panels are required when there is more than a 5% variance 
in the impairment ratings. 
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The Administrative Law Judge adopted a finding of 5% whole 
person permanent impairment with absolutely no factual support in 
the record. None of the many doctors who examined Mr. Ashcroft or 
his records assigned a 5% rating. The only support in the record 
for a 5% rating is the determination of Respondent Liberty Mutual's 
account manager in April 1990 that 5% was appropriate. (R. at 
158). 
There was also "conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days" as 
provided in section (A)(1)(b) of the administrative rule. Dr. 
Capel gave the Petitioner a work release on June 5, 1990 (R. at 
160) and that is the date Respondents have relied on for the cutoff 
of temporary total compensation. However, Dr. McNaught on 
September 5, 1991, well over a year later felt that date was in 
error. (R. at 179). Clearly there is a dispute as to the 
appropriate temporary total cutoff date which vary by far more than 
the mere 90 days provided in the Rule. This is another issue on 
which the assistance of a Medical Panel would have been extremely 
helpful. 
Finally, there is are medical expenses in controversy 
amounting to more than $2,000.00. The Administrative Law Judge 
made no findings on this issue, however the record does 
specifically document that there is at least $4,000.00 in disputed 
medical bills. (R. at 116). In addition, Mr. Ashcroft needs 
additional medical care which Respondents have refused to 
authorize. 
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The conflict in the medical reports and concern over legal and 
medical causation is why referral to a medical panel is required in 
the circumstances presented here and the failure to do so is more 
than an abuse of discretion-it is plain error. See Lipman v. 
Industrial Commission, supra and Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 
617 P. 2d 693 (Utah 1980) interpreting the former Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1953) which made referrals to medical 
panels mandatory in cases of denied liability. 
Even more than an abuse of discretion, the failure of an 
administrative agency to adhere to its own rules and regulations 
raises grave questions of possible violations of Petitioners 
constitutional right to equal protection of the law. 
Although reference to a medical panel under Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988) is discretionary, that discretion 
is not unrestricted and has been made mandatory in some 
circumstances by the Commission's own Rules and Regulations (Utah 
Admin. Code R568-1-9). The failure to refer a matter to a Medical 
Panel when such referral is mandatory is plain error. "In some 
cases, such as where the evidence of causal connection between the 
work-related event and the injury is uncertain or highly technical, 
failure to refer the case to a medical panel may be an abuse of 
discretion." Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 
P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985). See also Hone v. J.F. Shea Co. . 728 
P.2d 1008 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, the causal connection between the work-related 
injury and the Applicant's claims for additional compensation and 
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medical care if not clear, was at least uncertain and failure to 
refer the matter to a medical panel was error. The Order Denying 
Motion for Review should, at the least, be reversed and the matter 
remanded with directions to refer the matter to a Medical Panel 
since failure to do was in direct conflict with Industrial 
Commission practice and rule. The failure to obtain a Medical 
Panel opinion resulted in the Administrative Law Judge lacking 
essential and necessary information to adjudicate Petitionees 
claim. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the 
Industrial Commission erred when it entered it's August 21, 1992 
Order affirming the Order of the Administrative Law Judge and 
denied Mr. Ashcroft additional compensation for lack of medical 
causation. The uncontroverted evidence submitted to the industrial 
Commission supports the finding that he sustained a significant 
permanent partial impairment due to his 1989 industrial accident, 
and that his impairment exceeds 5%. To the extent there is any 
doubt or confusion as to medical causation, it was error for the 
Administrative Law Judge not to convene a Medical Panel. 
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court remand 
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to either 
award him benefits based on the uncontroverted facts and medical 
evidence presented, or in the alternative, to convene a medical 
panel. 
DATED this 36 th day of November, 1992. 
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J. wl: BRUCE WILSON, ESQ. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Petitioner were mailed, postage prepaid, on 
this n 'U day of December, 1992, to the following: 
Michael E. Dyer, Esq. 
50 "south Main, #700 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465 
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq. 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 South 300 East 
P.O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600 
JkUJA. 
Bruce Wilson 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A: Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77(1)(A) (1988). 
Utah Administrative Code R568-1-9. 
EXHIBIT B; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
(June 29, 1992). 
EXHIBIT C: Order Denying Motion for Review (August 21, 1992). 
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35-1-77. Medical panel — Hedical director or medical consultants — 
Discretionary authority of commission to refer case — Findings and reports — 
Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses. (Last amended 1991) 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by 
accident, or for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if 
the employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may 
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the 
commission. 
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due to 
an occupational disease is filed with the commission, the commission shall, 
except upon stipulation of all parties, appoint an impartial medical panel. 
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more physicians specializing 
in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim. 
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation 
of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission in its sole 
discretion may employ a medical director or medical consultants on a full-time 
or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical evidence and 
advising the commission with respect to its ultimate fact-finding 
responsibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or 
medical consultants, they shall be allowed to function in the same manner and 
under the same procedures as required of a medical panel. 
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make such study, take such X-rays, and perform such tests, including 
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as it may determine 
to be necessary or desirable. 
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the 
commission, and -also make such additional findings as the commission may 
require. In occupational disease cases, the panel shall certify to the 
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from 
performing work for remuneration or profit, and whether the sole cause of the 
disability or death, in the opinion of the panel, results from the occupation 
al disease and whether any other causes have aggravated, prolonged,* 
accelerated, or in any way contributed to the disability or death, and if so, 
the extent in percentage to which the other causes have so contributed. 
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to 
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by registered mail with 
return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited in the 
United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insurance 
carrier may file with the commission written objections to the report. If no 
written objections are filed within that period, the report is considered 
admitted in evidence. 
EXHIBIT A 
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(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of the 
panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by the 
report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a 
contrary finding. 
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the 
case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing, 
any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of the 
medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants present at the 
hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good cause shown, the 
commission may order other members of the panel, with or without the chairman 
or the medical director or medical consultants, to be present at the hearing 
for examination and cross-examination. 
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical 
consultants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be 
considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the 
testimony admitted. 
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical 
director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance before 
the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Seinsurance Fund, (as last 
amended by Chapter 116, Laws of Utah 1988) 
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R568-1-9 Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel. 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission adopts the 
following guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a 
case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be 
shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent 
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the 
whole person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 
days, and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting 
to more than $2,000. 
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be 
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical 
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel report. 
Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical 
evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a 
hearing, re-submit the new evidence to the panel for 
consideration and clarification. 
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured 
worker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of 
obtaining a further medical examination or evaluation 
pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to obtain a 
report addressing these medical issues in all cases where: 
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to 
give an impairment rating, 
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be 
non-industrial, and/or 
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such 
further evaluation. 
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical 
panel or medical consultant and of their appearance at the 
hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical 
examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative 
Law Judge, shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. 
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HEARING: Commission Conference Room, Washington County 
Commission offices, 197 East Tabernacle, St. 
George, Utah on May 19, 1992, at 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
Said hearing pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
The Honorable Lisa-Michele Church, Administrative 
Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and represented by Bruce 
Wilson, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by Michael Dyer, 
Attorney at Law. 
This is a claim for additional temporary total disability 
compensation and medical expenses in connection with a 9/25/89 
industrial injury. The defendant insurance carrier denies 
liability on the basis of medical and legal causation. 
An evidentiary hearing was held, during which oral and written 
evidence was presented. At the conclusion of the evidentiary 
hearing, the matter was taken under advisement by the 
Administrative Law Judge. Having been fully advised in the 
premises, the Administrative Law Judge now enters the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant in this matter, Denis Ashcroft, was employed as 
a driver for Airfax Express in 1989, earning 18 cents per mile. He 
was unmarried with no dependent children at the time of his injury. 
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On September 25, 1989, the applicant was unloading boxes with a 
dolly to persons on the ground at a Salt Lake K-Mart location, and 
he bent over and could not straighten up. He felt pain in his 
back, crawled to the edge of the truck bed and called his employer. 
His employer told him to finish unloading, but Ashcroft had the 
store employees do it for him. He then drove to another K-Mart and 
did the same. Ashcroft drove to Ogden, parked the truck, and took 
a taxi to the McKay Dee Hospital Emergency Room. 
At the emergency room, they took x-rays, gave him muscle 
relaxants and pain medication. No medical records were available 
from this visit. Thereafter the applicant rode the bus back to St. 
George. There, he consulted Dr. McGregor, his family doctor, on 
September 28, 1989 (Ex. D-01, p. 5). Dr. McGregor advised complete 
bed rest and continued to see him for two months. Dr. McGregor's 
records indicate a diagnosis of bulging disc/spinal stenosis and 
refer the applicant to Dr. Bliss, a neurosurgeon. 
Dr. Bliss saw the applicant on October 20, 1989, and 
diagnosed, ". . . central disc herniation with minor spinal 
stenosis at this level." He recommended conservative treatment. 
(Ex. D-l, p. 19.) 
In December, 1989, Dr. Bliss noted Ashcroft's continuing 
bilateral leg pain and reviewed his myelogram and CT scan. He 
stated his impression was ". . . sciatica-like symptoms with 
central disc herniation and no definite evidence of neural 
impingement." The applicant was then referred to Dr. Moress for a 
neurological consult. 
Dr. Moress saw Ashcroft on February 1, 1990 and recommended a 
complete myelography. Dr. Bliss reviewed this recommendation and 
noted " . . . [Dr. Moress] suspects possible demyelinating disorder 
if symptoms are not explained by stenosis. MRI scan of c. spine 
demonstrates multilevel disc disease. Previous lumbar myelogram 
and CT scan demonstrated multiple level bulging discs without 
definite stenosis." Later in the same report, Dr. Bliss stated, ". 
. . Patient clearly interprets all of his problems as stemming from 
his recent accident although multiple level disc disease indicates 
that he has had pre-existing problems and in addition, back pain is 
not his major complaint at this time." (Ex. D-l, p. 24.) 
On February 2, 1990, in response to an inquiry from State 
Vocational Rehabilitation, Dr. Bliss described Ashcroft's status as 
" . . . medically stable for return to limited employment in non-
laboring activity." (Ex. D-l, p. 26.) The applicant testified 
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that he applied for and was denied unemployment benefits in late 
1989, due to a prior lien. 
On April 12, 1990, the applicant consulted another orthopedic 
physician, Dr. Neal Capel. Dr. Capel saw him on 4/12/90 and 
recommended a program of conditioning for Ashcroft. In the notes 
of that visit, Dr. Capel also mentioned, " . . . Liberty Mutual 
account manager determined his permanent partial disability as 5%, 
March 26, 1990, is the cutoff of benefits...The patient will have 
his disability rating deferred until the conclusion of his work 
hardening and conditioning in 6 weeks." (Ex. D-l, p. 32.) 
At the May 10, 1990, visit with the applicant, Dr. Capel 
described a visit Ashcroft had made to the emergency room for 
intrascapular pain and noted, " . . . The most likely explanation is 
an anxiety reaction with somatization." Dr. Capel continued to 
recommend swimming, bicycle riding and general conditioning. 
At the June 5, 1990, visit, Dr. Capel's office notes state, ". 
. . The patient has no change in his status and was given a work 
release. He has a job as a cook that is eminent [sic] and was 
given a release from the welfare department." (Ex. D-l, p. 34.) 
Ashcroft testified he did apply for the cook position. Following 
this work release however, the applicant did not return to work, 
but began attending school at Dixie College. 
At the July 12, 1990, office visit, Dr. Capel stated that 
sitting required by the applicant's school activities was making 
him uncomfortable. He also had some aching muscles. Later in the 
summer, Dr. Capel prescribed Xanax for Ashcroft's anxiety symptoms. 
Ashcroft began working for his father in his grocery store in 
Arizona in September, 1990. This job lasted a few weeks. Dr. 
Capel's notes state, ". . .He has found that the back did fairly 
well but his legs got tired as he was on his feet all day on 
concrete." Dr. Capel continued to prescribe Xanax and Naprosyn. 
(Ex. D-l, p. 37.) 
Dr. Capel's notes for November 13, 1990, visit indicate that 
Ashcroft was having back and leg pain, and had discontinued some of 
his conditioning activities. His November 29, 1990, office notes 
describe a "new episode" of back pain occurring when Ashcroft 
lifted firewood and had, " . . . sudden onset of low back pain..." 
(Ex. D-l, p. 39.) Dr. Capel diagnosed facet syndrome and low back 
strain. The applicant testified that this episode involved him 
lifting two or three pieces of wood branches that would fit in his 
fireplace. 
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At his January 29, 1991f office visit, the applicant reported 
to Dr. Capel that he had worked in his father's grocery store again 
during Christmas and experienced leg aches. He requested a 
prescription of Ascendin, but Dr. Capel declined to prescribe it 
due to side effects. 
At Ashcroft's visit with Dr. Capel on March 15, 1991, Dr. 
Capel reported another episode of back pain: "The patient has been 
getting along reasonably well until March 14, 1991, when he bent 
down to clean up manure from his dog. He developed a sudden pain 
in the low back and had difficulty standing up straight." Dr. 
Capel concluded that the applicant had had a recurrence of 
iliolumbar strain sprain and, ". . .1 further advised him that as 
far as the Industrial Commission is concerned, He is an 
administrative catch 22 situation where he cannot force them to 
assume care of his present complaint and while it is possibly 
associated in quality relation, it is a new episode." (Ex. D-l, p. 
41.) Ashcroft testified that he was using a 3/4 length shovel and 
bent over and felt back pain. He then had difficulty straightening 
up. 
Following Dr. Capel's treatment, the applicant was examined by 
Dr. D.R. McNaught on May 8, 1991. Dr. McNaught concluded that 
Ashcroft did have severe sciatica, due to the bulging of lumbar 
discs L4,5 and possibly LS. He recommended that the applicant 
investigate surgery, although Dr. McNaught expressed some 
reservations about that approach. 
In fact, the applicant was not able to pursue surgical 
intervention on his back, due at least partially to the fact that 
he has Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. (Ex. D-l, p. 61-62.) 
The medical records indicate that Ashcroft tested positive for the 
HIV virus in the 1980s, and this condition has since developed into 
AIDS. (Ex. D-l, p. 10-17.) Dr. Hagen has treated the applicant 
for AIDS since 1989. He stated in a letter dated May 14, 1992, 
that the applicant's AIDS condition does not prevent him from 
conducting his normal activities, (Ex. A-l). Hagan's records also 
indicate that he treated Ashcroft for a variety of conditions, and 
that Ashcroft was taking Prozac for depression. 
Dr. McNaught referred the applicant to Dr. John Sanders for 
consideration of his back condition. Dr. Sanders produced several 
reports, including one dated August 9, 1991, which concluded that 
surgical intervention was not warranted at that time, with no 
reference to the AIDS factors. Dr. Sanders also wrote a one 
paragraph report dated October 7, 1991 stating: ". . .It is my 
opinion that because he is unable to return to his usual work that 
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he should have been given a disability rating of fifteen percent on 
that basis alone." (Ex. D-l, p. 66.) 
Dr. Boyd Holbrook performed a file review on the applicant's 
case on April 10, 1992, and found that the majority of his problems 
were not industrial in nature. Dr. Holbrook stated in part, ,f. . 
. This man does have significant multi-level cervical disc disease 
that is not related to his industrial injury and is not being 
considered for any possible surgical treatment and appears to be a 
relatively minor portion of his symptom complex." Dr. Holbrook 
opined that no further medical treatment was needed in connection 
with Ashcroft's 1989 injury, that, lf. . .it does not appear that 
more medical examinations or more diagnostic studies will assist in 
the delineation or management of his problem," and that Chymopapain 
injections are not advisable, (Ex. D-l, p. 67). 
Ashcroft also sought chiropractic care from Dr. Wageman in St. 
George. Those chiropractic records show the applicant received 
treatments from September 27, 1991, through December, 1991 for 35 
visits. Dr. Wageman believed that Ashcroft suffered, ". . .an 
exacerbation of his post-traumatic injuries sustained in the 
original accident," of 1989 (Ex. A-l). 
The applicant's medical records indicate that he has undergone 
the following diagnostic procedures since his industrial injury: x-
rays (10/89), CT scan (10/89), myelogram-CT scan (12/89), MRI 
(2/90), CT scan (5/91), x-rays (10/91), MRI (10/91). 
The applicant currently experiences aches in his back and 
legs. He takes AZT, wellbutrin and dalmane, as well as headache 
medicines. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant in this matter, Denis Ashcroft, unfortunately 
has failed to sustain his burden of proof that further temporary 
total disability benefits or medical expense benefits are causally 
related to his industrial accident of 1989. In fact, according to 
medical specialists, the true cause of the applicant's continuing 
problems stem from pre-existing degenerative problems, intervening 
non-industrial events, and unrelated health conditions. Therefore, 
his claim fails for lack of medical and legal causation. 
At the time of the hearing, there was no evidence that 
Ashcroft was unable to work during the period of his additional 
temporary total disability claim. The applicant testified that he 
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applied for unemployment, applied for a job as a cook, and in fact, 
attended school full-time. He also worked in his father's grocery 
store for a time. Two doctors had released him to work (Dr. Bliss, 
2/2/90) (Dr. Capel, 6/5/90) and considered him medically stable. 
No other medical provider has taken him off work. Utah workers 
compensation law is specific on this issue, ,f. . . Once a claimant 
reaches medical stabilization, the claimant is moved from temporary 
to permanent status and he is no longer eligible for temporary 
benefits." Booms v. Rapp Constructionf 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 
1986.) Lack of stabilization is the plaintiff's burden to prove, 
Griffith v. Industrial Commission, 754 P.2d 981 (Ct. of App. Utah 
1988). 
Applicant's counsel argues that Ashcroft is entitled to 
further benefits while he is still in the "diagnostic11 stage of his 
treatment for his back injury. Unfortunately, the medical records 
clearly indicate that this case has long ago exhausted the 
diagnostic stage. In fact, the applicant has been seen by at least 
six specialists, and has had every possible diagnostic test 
performed at least twice for his back pain symptoms. The case is 
also tragically complicated by the presence of the applicant's AIDS 
condition, which may not have become a ••. . .severe medical v 
problem," but ultimately is life-threatening and therefore bound to 
influence the applicant's choices with regard to surgery, 
employment, as well as any optional medical treatment. 
Further, the medical records in this file indicate that the 
applicant's case involves psychological components. Moreover, when 
carefully reviewed, it is illogical for one to attempt to pin all 
the troublesome circumstances of a situation on a single incident 
of lumbar strain several years ago, particularly when that 
condition stabilized within months and was one which the doctors 
refused to surgically treat. 
Applicant's counsel further argues that the applicant may fall 
into the rare category of one who suffers a sacroiliac condition 
that is difficult to diagnose. There is no indication, however, of 
that suspicion on behalf of Ashcroft's numerous physicians. Such 
arguments are speculative and general, and cannot be the basis of 
extending workers compensation benefits indefinitely to the 
applicant. 
The Administrative Law Judge agrees with Ashcroft's physicians 
who have identified this case as a complex one, involving pre-
existing and psychological factors. In addition, the applicant 
experienced two subsequent non-industrial events which occurred 
when his doctor said he was doing well. The improvement he was 
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making, together with the strenuous nature of the incidents 
themselves, render those subsequent events intervening and causally 
contributing to his continuing back problems* 
As to the permanent partial impairment rating, the applicant 
was paid compensation on a 5% whole person permanent partial 
disability rating by the defendants. The Administrative Law Judge 
does not find a specific rating in the records: Dr. Capel merely 
recites what the insurance adjustor was offering and postpones a 
rating; Dr. Sanders makes a conclusory statement of 15% without 
reference to any underlying facts or industrial cause. Without a 
well-supported rating in the record, and the Administrative Law 
Judge can only note that a 5% impairment is reasonable for an 
unoperated disc problem according to the AMA Guides To the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Table 53. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim of the applicant, Denis 
Ashcroft, for additional temporary total disability and medical 
expenses compensation in connection with his industrial injury of 
September 25, 1989, should be and is hereby denied for lack of 
legal and medical causation. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Lisa-Michele Church 
Administrative Law 
Certified this ^ d a y of . tQa^jL^ , 199,2. 
ATTEST: £/ 
Patricia 0. Ashby /t^T^T V v - ^ f ^ ^ - " / 
Commission Secretary ^ \sO< , -S.« ',' " 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600 
Denis Ashcroft, * 
* 
Applicant, * DENIAL OF MOTION 
VS. * FOR REVIEW 
* 
Airfax Express, and/or * 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., * Case No. 91000984 
Respondents. * 
********************************* * 
The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for 
Review of applicant in the above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12. 
The applicant's claim asks for additional compensation and 
payments in connection with medical expenses, temporary total 
compensation (TTC), permanent partial compensation (PPC), travel 
expenses, interest, and medical treatment as a result of his back 
injury on September 25, 1989. The administrative law judge (ALJ) 
concluded that the applicant had failed to show legal and medical 
causation, and therefore denied his claim. It is from this denial 
that the applicant appeals based on allegations of the following 
errors: 
1. Rejection by the ALJ of two permanent partial 
disability ratings in favor of a two year old rating done by the 
"Liberty Mutual account manager." 
2. The failure of the ALJ to order that a medical panel 
be convened to consider among other items the question of maximum 
medical improvement. 
3. The ALJ did not consider that the treating doctors 
were in the diagnostic stages of the case, and the doctors had not 
decided upon a course of treatment. 
4. The ALJ lost or ignored the chiropractor's results 
that the applicant was improving with chiropractic treatment. 
5. This case contains objective evidence of several 
radiographically verified disc injuries, and surgery was a "clear 
possibility but for the complication of the AIDS." 
The respondents argue in rebuttal that the medical evidence 
did not give rise to the need for a medical panel review, and that 
there is no conflict in the medical evidence regarding the 
applicant's attainment of maximum medical improvement. We will 
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ASHCROFT 
ORDER 
PAGE TWO . 
briefly discuss the pertinent facts as they relate to the 
allegations of error• 
There seems to be no dispute about the basic facts of the 
original industrial injury in 1989. At that time, the applicant 
was a driver for Air fax Express. On September 25, 1989, he was 
using a dolly to unload boxes at a K-Mart. He bent over, and could 
not thereafter stand straight. Experiencing pain in his back, he 
crawled to the edge of his truck, and called his employer. His 
employer told him to finish unloading.1 He apparently was able to 
have the K-Mart employees complete the task, and he subsequently 
drove to another K-Mart where he was again able to have its 
employees do the same. The applicant then drove to Ogden, parked 
his truck, and used a taxi to get to a hospital emergency room. 
The emergency room treatment and procedures consisted of x-
rays, muscle relaxants, and pain medication. After a trip back to 
St. George by bus, the applicant was treated by his family doctor, 
Dr. McGregor, on September 28, 1989. After a period of bed rest, 
the applicant was seen by the doctor during the following two 
months. Dr. McGregor diagnosed the applicant as having bulging 
disc/spinal stenosis. The doctor referred the applicant to Dr. 
Bliss, a neurosurgeon. 
Dr. Bliss saw the applicant on a number of occasions during 
the period October 20, 1989 through February 20, 1990. The doctor 
recommended that the applicant receive conservative treatment, and 
stated that "...Patient clearly interprets all of his problems as 
stemming from his recent accident although multiple level disc 
disease indicates that he has had pre-existing problems and in 
addition, back pain is not his major complaint at this time." 
Exhibit D-l, at 24. Further, the*doctor concluded on February 2, 
1990 that the applicant was "...medically stable for return to 
limited employment in nonlaboring activity." Id., at 26. 
During the period April 12, 1990 through March 15, 1991, the 
applicant was treated by Dr. Capel. Dr. Capel placed the applicant 
on a work hardening and conditioning program. On May 10, 1990, the 
applicant experienced intrascapular pain, and went to an emergency 
room for treatment. The doctor explained this episode as an 
anxiety reaction with somatization, and recommended general 
conditioning, bicycle riding, and swimming. On June 5, 1990, the 
applicant was given a work release, and apparently told the doctor 
that he had an imminent job as a cook. Apparently, the applicant 
did not return to work, but instead attended Dixie College as a 
student. 
Between July 12, 1990, and March 15, 1991, the applicant 
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experienced muscle aches, back and leg pain, and anxiety symptoms 
on various occasions. Low back pain appeared after the applicant 
lifted two or three pieces of firewood, and a second episode 
occurred when the applicant attempted to clean up some of his dog's 
excrement. Dr. Capel noted on November 13, 1990 that the applicant 
had discontinued some of his conditioning exercises. 
It appears that surgery is either not warranted for the 
applicant's medical problems, or is not recommended due to AIDS 
which has developed in the applicant from his initial contact with 
the HIV in the 1980's. Although one doctor recommended that the 
applicant investigate surgery (Dr. McNaught), another (Dr. Hunter) 
indicated that some surgery may be possible, two other doctors have 
indicated that surgery is not warranted (Dr. Holbrook and Dr. 
Sanders) . Dr. Holbrook reviewed the applicant's file and concluded 
that the majority of the applicant's problems were not industrial 
in nature. The doctor concluded that additional medical 
examinations or diagnostic studies will not assist in the 
"delineation or management of [the applicant's] problem [in 
connection with the 1989 injury...." Exhibit D-l at 67. 
Contrary to the view of Dr. Holbrook, and others, is that of 
a treating chiropractic physician, Dr. Wageman, who believed that 
• the applicant suffered "...an exacerbation of his post-traumatic 
injuries sustained in the original accident..." of 1989. Exhibit 
A-l. We have concluded that the specialists who determined that 
the applicant's problems were not industrial in nature outweigh the 
opinion of Dr. Wageman. 
The ALJ concluded that the applicant had failed to sustain his 
burden of proof that he was further entitled to TTC or to medical 
expense benefits. There is substantial evidence in the file in 
light of the entire record to show that the applicant's continuing 
problems result from conditions unrelated to the industrial 
accident. Thus, the applicantjias failed to show medical and legal 
causation. u~~Urfdef these circumstances, no medical panel Ts" 
necessary. . — — , 
The file shows that two doctors considered the applicant to be 
medically stable during the period that the applicant claims 
additional TTC. As a result, they had released the applicant to 
work. It is clear that when an injured worker is released from 
temporary total disability status that TTC should no longer be 
received. Booms v. Rapp Construction, 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 
1986). 
The applicant's argument that he was still within the 
diagnostic stages of treatment is contrary to the evidence. Six 
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specialists have reviewed his case over time, and the applicant has 
had numerous diagnostic tests completed. None of the specialists 
with the possible exception of Dr. Hunter have concluded that 
surgery is warranted or possible. Dr. Holbrook, for example, 
concluded that no further examinations or diagnostic tests were 
warranted. This statement shows that the diagnostic period was 
complete. 
This case is complicated by the applicants pre-existing 
medical problems, and by his limitation on medical choices forced 
upon him by AIDS. In addition, the applicant suffered two 
subsequent nonindustrial accidents which can be considered to be 
intervening and causally contributing events to the applicant's 
continuing back problems. 
In connection with the permanent partial impairment rating, 
the applicant argues that he should be given a higher rating since 
Dr. Sanders indicated that a 15 percent rating was appropriate 
since the applicant could not work. The applicant also cited Dr. 
Capel as support for this contention that the rating previously 
determined at five percent was too low. We note that the applicant 
was paid for his permanent partial impairment compensation. We 
agree with the ALJ that a five percent impairment is reasonable for 
an unoperated disc problem based upon the Guides to the Evaluation 
of Permanent Impairmentf Table 53 (3d ed. rev. 1990) published by 
the American Medical Association. 
The bald statement by Dr. Sanders, in connection with his 
assertion that a 15 percent rating was appropriate, was supported 
by absolutely no medical analysis or logic. We need some 
justification, and in the absence of such, we cannot speculate. In 
the case of Dr. Capel, there is no statement by him as to any 
appropriate rating, other than a statement that the adjustor had 
decided upon a five percent rating. We therefore conclude that the 
evidence does not support the applicant in this regard. 
Under the circumstances, we conclude that the ALJ's findings, 
conclusions of law, and order were based upon substantial evidence 
in light of the entire record, and the legal conclusions were 
correct. The applicant has failed to prove his case. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge 
dated June 29, 1992 is affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
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